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2. Distinguishing the senses
2.1 Hearing as a sensory faculty
Our access to sounds is quite specific: we  hear them.  But what 
does  “hearing”  mean? The  access  to  sounds  is  specifically  sensory: 
hearing cannot be reduced to thinking of sounds, or to having beliefs about 
sounds.  Furthermore, hearing sounds is not reducible to the recording of sound 
information by the means of the auditory system.  Nor to just having the 
simple  impression  of  hearing  sounds,  nor  even  to  actually  having 
auditory sensations.
There is a wealth of attempts to provide a classification of the senses in 
the philosophical tradition, while the nature of sounds and the foundations of 
their classification do not seem to attract the philosopher’s interest quite as 
much.  Hearing is traditionally listed as one of the five senses.  But why five 
senses?  And what is a sense?  Senses are faculties, but then can perception 
not be described as a faculty too?  Are senses sub-faculties of perception, or 
are they independent faculties?  Add to this that there is no universal 
agreement concerning what kind of faculty perception is.
In the taxonomies proposed by traditional philosophy, the senses are 
commonly and univocally associated with specific sensory objects, the 
proper sensibles.  The idea is that, in spite of the existence of common 
sensibles that can constitute the object of different senses (i.e. shape and 
movement, accessible to sight as well as to touch), a certain number of 
sensory objects are  sense-specific,  and thus help to individualize the 
senses.  Thus sounds are the objects of audition, colors those of vision, 
and so on.  In reality, some authors, like Berkeley, claim that visual shapes 
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are not the same as tactile ones, thus implying that shape is not a common 
sensory  object  (see  chapter  7).  Moreover,  in  order  for  them  to  be 
considered  as  suitable  criteria  for  distinguishing  between  senses,  it  is 
necessary for proper sensibles to be individuated without making reference 
to  any  particular  sense. A  preliminary  characterization  of  color  as  an 
essentially visual object would make the characterization of vision as the 
faculty of perceiving circular.  But even under these conditions, the criterion 
is not fully satisfactory:  an organism which can successfully make use of 
its eyes (organs akin to our eyes, from the physiological and the structural 
point of view) for accessing sounds, could alternatively be described as 
seeing sounds and as hearing by the means of its eyes.  In the absence of 
further specifications, the fact of perceiving sounds still does not suffice to 
establish if the organism is endowed with the faculty of hearing.
In the present chapter we make reference to recent discussions (Grice, 1962; 
Roxbee Cox, 1970; Leon, 1988; Nelkin, 1990) in order to show that there is one 
and only one reliable criterion for distinguishing between the senses, and that this 
criterion consists in considering sensory modalities as defined by two elements:  a 
sensory organ and a class of beliefs that are specifically justified in relation to that 
organ. This  dual-component  theory  carries  a  seemingly  surprising 
consequence:  that  sensations play no role in the definition of the senses. 
Hearing, for instance, does not require one to possess sound sensations.  Even 
if one had never been under the impression of hearing sounds, one could not, 
for that reason only, be considered deaf.  We shall discuss the implications of 
this theory and its compatibility with the physicalist theory of sounds that 
we have presented in chapter 3.  Since our criterion of choice refers to a 
specific class of beliefs, we will demonstrate what it means for a belief to be 
specifically auditory in nature.
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2.2. Distinguishing between the senses
We will not broach the general, methodological question:  what 
are  the  requirements  for  a  criterion  of  distinction  between  the 
senses  to  be  appropriate?   We  all  have  pre-theoretical  intuitions 
concerning how many senses there are, or the idea that vision and touch 
are distinct.  By this we do not intend to rule out the possibility of a most 
interesting empirical discovery, i.e.  that,  in fact,  no matter how they 
appear to us, vision and touch are not distinct senses. We are merely 
presupposing that an appropriate criterion must, at the very least, provide 
an answer to specific questions, such as:  what distinguishes sight and 
hearing, supposing that they are distinct?   It is clear, moreover, that a 
criterion that answers  this metaphysical question does not necessarily 
answer the epistemological question of how we know whether sight and 
hearing, or two distinct senses in general, really are distinct.  Let us start 
by addressing the epistemological question, and we will continue with 
the metaphysical one in section 2.3.
According to Grice (1962, 1989: 250), the senses can be distinguished 
according to four possible dimensions: (i) the kind of things that constitute 
their object (colors and shapes in the case of sight, scents in the case of 
smell) – we call this the property criterion); (ii) the characteristics of the 
the  experiences  that  are  involved  in  perception;  (iii)  the  differences 
between stimuli (contact in the case of touch, light in the case of sight); 
and, finally, (iv) the type of perceptual organ (and its connections to the 
brain).  Grice does not rule out the possibility that each criterion, on its 
own, could be insufficient, and that multiple criteria might have to be 
combined in order to obtain an appropriate taxonomy. 
The  proposition  advanced  by  Roxbee  Cox  (1970)  constitutes  an 
improvement of the property criterion (i) described by Grice. In fact, a 
key  property  is  associated  with  each  perceptual  modality. A certain 
perceptual event will then be classified as presenting a certain perceptual 
modality  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  perception  presents  its  object  as 
something  possessing  the  key  property  of  that  perceptual  modality. 
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According to the property criterion, sight could never be distinguished 
from touch, because there are properties that can be perceived by sight 
as well as by touch - as in the case of shape.  If perception is analyzed 
in terms of beliefs, then the property criterion rests on the existence 
of  beliefs  concerning,  for  example,  states  of  affairs  that  are 
specifically auditory, rather than on the existence of beliefs that have 
an auditory justification.  The latter condition wouldn’t be suitable for 
distinguishing between sight and touch either, because states of affairs 
such as the one described by the sentence: “there’s a hole in my jacket” 
can be perceived both  through sight and by touch.  But this difficulty 
vanishes if we associate each sense to a key property, which can’t be 
perceived but by the intervention of one precise sense:  heat in the case 
of touch, color in the case of sight, and, if we accept Berkeley’s remark, 
visual shape as opposed to tactile shape (Leon 1988: 248).
There are two dimensions in our experiential  reports:  the first 
one represents the contents of the experience, while the second one 
represents the modality of the experience (i.e. auditory as opposed 
than visual). According to Leon (1988) the intuitions according to 
which there  is a  phenomenological difference  between seeing and 
hearing  that  is  accessible  to  introspection  should  be  taken  into 
account (p. 265-266).  Thus, in the case of sight and of touch, seeing 
an  object  as  a  square  object  seems  different  from feeling  it  as  a 
square  (p.  244).  However,  this  intuition  does  not  enable  one  to 
immediately and appropriately distinguish between the senses:  it is 
still necessary to explain the possibility that two distinct experiences, 
that are phenomenologically identified as such, can still belong to 
one and the same perceptual modality.  For instance, one could find that 
the experience of seeing a triangle and the experience of seeing a square 
are far more different from each other than are the experiences of seeing 
and of touching a square.
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Up till now we have presented a series of positions without insisting on the 
relevant motivations for or against them.  In any case, it seems that none of 
the criteria that we have listed above has the capacity of drawing a clear 
and appropriate distinction between the senses.  This is the thesis of Nelkin 
(1990), and we agree with him.   First, as we have already underlined, the 
property criterion (i) presents the following drawback:  certain properties are 
common sensibles, and can be perceived according to different perceptual 
modalities.  The enhanced version of the property criterion, the one proposed 
by  Roxbee  Cox,  is  not  exempt  from  difficulties.  On  the  one  hand, 
individuating a key property does not explain the distinction that we draw 
between seeing and feeling a shape; on the other hand, we would have to 
accept  an uncontrolled multiplication of  senses,  i.e.,  multiple  forms of 
touch:  a sense of touch for thermal properties, a sense of touch for texture, 
all differing from each other at least to the same extent that taste differs 
from smell.  A rather counterintuitive assertion, as Hamilton has observed 
(see Reid, 1983: 119).
Criterion (iv),  which refers  to  the difference  between  sensory 
organs,  is  vulnerable  to  a  similar  objection:   the  difficulty  of 
avoiding the multiplication of many differing senses of touch (one 
for each part of the body which is provided with tactile receptors) 
and audition (one for each ear).  Making reference to a type of organ 
rather than to a token helps to solve the problem in the case of hearing, but 
not in that of touch.
The same is true for criterion (ii), since from the fact that thermal 
sensations feel rather different from the sensations produced by pressure, 
one is not compelled to hold that the two constitute different forms of 
touch (Nelkin, 1990: 148-152).  It can be added that the stimulus criterion (iii) 
does  not  enable  one  to  predict  a  distinction  between  visual  and  thermal 
perception, since in both cases the relevant medium can be constituted by 
electromagnetic radiation.  It would seem that H. von Helmholtz (1852, 1992: 
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29) derived the correct consequences of the acceptance of criterion (iii) when, 
in discussing a case similar to our counter-example, he asserted that in his 
view, the human skin should be construed as a kind of extended, primitive eye.
Nelkin therefore introduces a belief criterion (v):  perception is, among 
other things, a mechanism for generating beliefs.  These beliefs may surely 
differ according to the perceptual modality which has taken part in their 
generation.  Thus, beliefs that concern the distance and position of some object 
in relation to the observer can take on a different form according to whether 
they are acquired by sight or by hearing.  In fact, the distance of objects that 
are not accessible to sight can be determined by the means of hearing, as 
in the case of the telephone that rings in another room (see below, section 
2.4).
But the proposed criterion is still too strong: from the fact that we have 
specifically different beliefs, we are not in a position to conclude that we have 
two different senses.  For instance, from the existence of two visual beliefs that 
are specifically different, the first of which concerns shape while the second 
concerns the distance of an object, one cannot deduce the existence of  two 
distinct “shape-sight” and “distance-sight senses”.
Nonetheless, Nelkin suggests that a combination of two criteria 
should constitute a sufficient condition for establishing an appropriate 
classification.  For example, the sensation criterion can be paired with 
the perceptual organ criterion, or the perceptual organ criterion with the 
belief  criterion;  alternatively,  the  organ/sensation  couple  can  be 
enhanced by associating it with the organ/belief couple (Nelkin 190: 
152-6).
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2.3 The nature of the senses
As rightly argued by Nelkin, the taxonomic classification of the 
senses is only partly an epistemological problem, a problem to which 
we have dedicated section 2.2 by discussing the different criteria for 
distinguishing between the senses.  Yet, the problem of the nature of 
the senses remains unsolved.  Knowing how to distinguish between the 
senses is one thing, another is understanding what the senses are (for 
those who think that epistemological criteria should harmonize with 
a theory of the nature of the senses, we can anticipate that Nelkin’s 
theory  also  possesses  this  advantage,  among others).  Nelkin  has 
imagined  a  thought  experiment  aimed  at  showing  that  each 
perceptual modality has at least two components: on the one hand, 
the possibility of acquiring beliefs of a certain kind, and on the other 
the presence of a perceptual organ which is capable of acquiring that 
kind  of  information.   The specification of the perceptual  organ can 
certainly represent a problem:  let us imagine someone who claims to see 
by means of his ears; should we continue to call these organs “ears”? 
The sensory organ is the lower limit of perception – our interface with 
the surrounding world.  There are two possible mental candidates for the 
upper limit:  belief and sensation.  According to the following thought 
experiment, sensations could be ruled out.   Let  us imagine a race  of 
Martians  with  perfectly  working  ears;  in  fact  these  Martians  can 
correctly locate events happening behind their back, as shown by they 
fact that they take shelter when they hear an explosion.  Also, they 
form, by the means of their ears, the very same beliefs that we consider to 
be specific of hearing.  But let us also suppose that in all these cases 
they develop non-auditory sensations:  a loud noise is perceived as a 
flash of light, they are under the impression of seeing red when they 
hear a D sharp.  Let us now turn to  Venusians, which differ from us in 
a complementary way:  D sharp provokes the same effect on them that 
D sharp  has  upon us;  but  they  cannot  form the  same,  appropriate, 
judgments in presence of surrounding sounds (they do not seek shelter 
in  presence  of  an  explosion,  they  cannot  locate  a  sound  which  is 
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produced behind  their  backs).  In  other  words,  they have  the right 
sensations, but not the relative beliefs (we will see that, at the end of the 
day,  the  possibility  of  dissociating  intrinsically  visual  beliefs  from 
intrinsically visual impressions is questionable).
We would probably be more inclined to ascribe the capacity of hearing 
to  the  Martians,  rather  than  to  the  Venusians,  and  to  conclude  that 
sensations  are  not  essential  to  audition,  while  appropriately  generated 
beliefs are.
The thought experiment  we have presented involving Martians 
and Venusians is,  in a  sense,  symmetrical  to the one described  by 
Kripke:
Perhaps  we  can  imagine  that,  by  some  miracle,  sound 
waves somehow enabled some creature to see.  I mean, they 
gave him visual impressions identical to ours, including, maybe, the 
perception of color. We can also imagine the same creature as 
being completely insensitive to light (photons).  Who knows 
what subtle, undreamt of, possibilities there might be?  Would 
we say that in such a possible world,  sound was light,  that 
these wave motions in the air were light? (1972: 70)
Kripke answers that we would be inclined to describe the situation 
as a form of deviant sensibility to sound waves.  The word “light” is not 
synonymous with “that which produces visual impressions in us, that 
which puts us in the condition of seeing”.  In fact, the latter description 
simply enables us to establish the reference to light.  In the same way, if 
we begin by focusing on the perceptual faculty rather than on the object of 
perception, we can say that sound sensations enable us to ascertain the reference to 
hearing, without, however, contributing to its definition.  The fact that they enable 
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us to ascertain this reference gives us the illusion that sensations are essential. 
Besides, if having sound sensations is what matters in the appreciation of 
music - rather than forming certain beliefs concerning the location of the 
sound sources in the environment - and if we accept the thesis concerning 
the nature of audition, then we should accept what at first might seem a 
rather bizarre, yet reasonable, conclusion:  that the appreciation of music 
does not require hearing.  It is indeed possible to conceive a solipsistic musical 
subject who has no beliefs concerning sound events but who hears symphonies 
as a consequence of hallucinations.
The possession of beliefs seems to be a necessary but insufficient 
condition  for  defining  the  senses,  as  shown  by  the  fact,  in  certain 
intermediate  cases,  in the absence of a precise  reference to the organ 
involved,  examining the beliefs  does not  help to  determine the sense 
involved.  Let us go back to the previous case, the one involving the being 
that successfully  uses  its  ears  in order  to access  the shape of  distant 
objects.  What would we say of  it: that  it hears shapes, or that  it sees 
shapes by the means of  its ears?  The beliefs that are involved in this 
example are of a purely visual nature (“There is a square over there”), but 
we are not authorized, by this fact, to affirm that the organism sees.  At the 
same time this is a borderline case, because we could not say that the 
organism does not see, or that it hears shapes.  An apparently similar case 
is represented by blind people “seeing with their hands”.  But as a matter 
of fact, if beliefs concerning the objects’ shape constitute a part of the 
beliefs that are specific to touch, the same is true of sight.  The case would 
become  much  more  intriguing  if  blind  people  could  identify  distant 
objects by stretching out their hands in their direction.
2.4. Specifically auditory beliefs
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The metaphysical issue of the distinction between the senses cannot be 
solved without recognizing the central role of our beliefs.  But in what 
manner are these beliefs distinct from each other, and in what measure does 
distinguishing between beliefs help to establish a distinction between the 
senses?  Setting apart the typically qualitative contents of experience (those 
qualia which determine what it is like to hear, say, D sharp rather than B) - 
because they are related to sensations, and we have previously established 
that sensations are not essential - we are left with two possibilities when 
faced with the prospect of distinguishing between beliefs:  the way beliefs 
are justified in relation to their spatial content, and the way beliefs are 
justified  in  relation to  the  properties  of  the represented  objects.  The 
mention of the epistemic filiation of beliefs, that is to say the way they in 
which are justified, is consistent with choosing the perceptual organ as 
the other component that contributes to the distinction of the senses. 
Indeed, the sensory organ plays an important causal role in justification.
2.4.1. Spatial content
Our examples of beliefs about sounds (such as the one involving 
Martians and Venusians)  were  concerned  with spatial  contents. In 
this respect, we may draw inspiration from the observations made by 
Jean Nogué concerning the organization of the sensory spaces that are 
associated to each sense.  Nogué purports to show that sense data follow 
specific  forms of  organization,  that  is  to  say  that  they  are  variously 
distributed in space according to their type.  We can use Nogué’s indications 
without committing to his metaphysics of the sensible, and by translating his 
approach in terms of specific beliefs.  In the case of smell, for instance, the 
key concept is that of the “source which occupies a certain position in 
the region outside the individual”, which “indeed, makes it possible for 
one to undertake a […] complex [...]   research activity because, rather 
than waiting for the object to come within our reach, we can anticipate 
its location and calculate long distance movements in order to find it” 
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(Nogué, 1937: 135).
The  elements  of  spatial  content  are  here  « varied  sense  and 
direction, the notion of an external region, but such that we think that  
the object possesses an yet to be determined position in it, which  
calls for a search »; these elements are joined in the notion of a scent:  
« odor comes to us from without, from a certain source, which we  
can approach at a regular pace: we just have to follow the direction  
and sense in which the degrees of the sensation increase  » (Nogué, 
1937 : 135).
Les éléments du  contenu  spatial  sont  ici  «sens  et  direction 
variés, notion d'une région extérieure, mais avec cette différence  
qu'au sein de celle-ci nous allons supposer que l'objet  possède  
une  certaine  position  encore  indéterminée,  qui  soulève  un  
problème de quête));  ces éléments se réunissent dans la notion  
d'effluve, <<l'odeur vient à nous du dehors, à partir d'une certaine 
source, dont nous pouvons nous rapprocher d'une façon régulière  
: il suffit de suivre à la fois sa direction et le sens dans lequel les 
degrés de la sensation vont croissant ,, (Nogué, 1937 : 135).
The specific characteristic of smell’s spatial content consists in the 
fact  that,  by moving, we can  infer the distance between us and its 
source.   The growing intensity is an indicator of the proximity of the 
source.  If taken in isolation, the contents of smell do not provide any 
information concerning the position or distance of the source; it is only 
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through the comparison of multiple contents that we can infer these 
properties.  This idea perfectly characterizes the behavior which is 
described as “following a scent”.
In one actual case, auditory beliefs are similar to olfactory ones, as 
far as the kind of spatial information they carry is concerned.  When 
deep diving one cannot determine the direction of the source of an 
isolated sound which is located under the water’s surface (such as the 
engine of a boat), and one is forced to move in order to compare a 
succession  of  sound  presentations,  the  intensity  of  which  varies 
according to their distance from the source.  This case, that we may call 
that of the “sound-scent”, constitutes a transition from the structure of 
justification which is specific to smell to the one which is involved in 
normal auditory perception.  Nogué makes the following suggestion:
By adding  the  notion of  distance to  that  of  source,  and  by 
introducing  at  the  same  time  the  notion  of  the  simultaneous 
existence  of  multiple  sources,  we  obtain  a  new  spatial 
combination, richer than the previous ones, and of potentially 
considerable interest in that it makes possible the orientation of 
action at great distance (and not only step by step as is the case 
for scents), whilst at the same time ensuring the appraisal of the 
area extending beyond the direction which is presently followed. 
This  is  the  combination  which  is  realized  by  the  sense  of 
hearing.   Indeed,  when a  sound is  produced it  has  a  clearly 
determined  direction  and  a  pre-specified  distance,  but 
nonetheless natural sounds exist in a polyphonic way that has no 
equivalent  in the world of smells,  where  the sense is always 
forced to choose one smell over the others.  In virtue of this fact, 
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sounds enable simultaneous representations of multiple possible 
actions, even when one of them is in the process of being carried 
out. (p. 137)
There are several characteristics that we shall outline in this way: 
firstly,  in  normal  cases,  auditory  beliefs  present  a  group of  objects 
simultaneously; secondly, they locate the object as being in a certain 
position in relation to the hearer; finally, the notion of scent no longer 
comes into play.
The  determination of  the  position of  the object  is  much more 
exact in the case of sight than it is in the case of hearing, and in 
virtue  of  this  fact  the  distinction  between  the  structure  of  the 
justification  that  is  suitable  for  visual  beliefs  and  that  which  is 
suitable to auditory beliefs is reinforced.  On the other hand, “the ear 
[…]  is  a  remarkable  organ  of  discovery,  even  more  varied  in  its 
applications than the eye, since it may function in all circumstances 
and even through a number of masks that block the field of vision” 
(p. 137).
In particular, hearing makes accessible to us objects and events that are 
out of sight, because they are masked by obstacles, because they are behind 
the  hearer’s  back,  or  because  they  occur  inside  objects  that  are  not 
transparent to sight.
To sum things up, we can distinguish between two major classes of 
senses: in the first one we find hearing, smell and sight, which, in contrast 
to  touch,  are  typically  related  to  distance  (they  enable  us  to  gather 
information about distant objects).  Furthermore, hearing and touch make 
possible the gathering of information about objects that are not accessible 
to sight and hearing can access events that are not available to smell.
2.4.2 Categorization
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Information  carried  by  the  sense  of  hearing  is  clearly  not 
reducible to spatial information.  An important part of the cognitive 
value  of  sounds is  due to  the fact  that  sounds inform us as  to  the 
internal composition of objects, or as to the material (or materials) a 
sounding object is made of.  An obvious advantage of the theory that 
we defend in chapter 3 is that this fact is strictly dependent upon the 
nature of sound, an event in the material the object is made of.  Hence it 
is natural that sounds constitute sources of information that are primarily 
concerned with this material. This is a salient kind of information, because 
it enables us to outline a primary categorization of objects.  Glass and 
wood react very differently to percussion; shaking a wool cover will 
produce a light and dull ruffle, while the same sway imposed to sheet 
metal of equal shape and size will produce a distinctive clang.  The 
differences that are perceived are due to differences in the material 
out of which the object is made and in its organization. 
These differences enable us to effectuate a first classification of the 
objects on the basis of the characteristic way their matter sounds (Schapp 
1912,  1925,  chapter  II;  Conrad-Martius,  1924:  282;  a  detailed 
phenomenology can be found in Gibson,  1966:  89,  and sqq.)  This is 
certainly a very rough classification, which may justify a number of quite 
significant  revisions,  as  is  the  case  for  any  purely  perceptual 
classification.  Nonetheless, it possesses an indicative value.  In general 
terms, we can subscribe to a minimalist principle concerning the quality 
of  our  epistemic  states,  the  differential  principle:   to  any  perceptual 
difference there must correspond a difference in the world.  Perception is 
an epistemically reliable source if, given the same observational conditions, a 
perceptual difference reflects a difference between objects.  Perception could 
not be considered reliable if it happened to be completely independent from the 
observed object, that is if, given the same observational conditions, the object 
could be presented as different by perception (if, for instance, when looking at a 
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red surface which does not vary during the whole period of our observation, we 
saw  it  sometimes  as  being  red  and  sometimes  as  being  blue).  The 
complementary  epistemic fault  of  underdetermination  does not  affect 
reliability as seriously:  our perceptions are underdetermined when we 
perceive two differently colored objects as having the same color.  The 
converse of the differential principle, according to which a difference in the 
world must correspond to a difference in perception, obviously cannot be 
endorsed.  The rough, approximate nature of hearing does not prevent it from 
contributing to knowledge.  If hearing retains its role as a rough means getting 
one’s bearing in the world, it is also in virtue of its conformity to the differential 
principle (a perceptual difference is linked to a difference in the world), a 
conformity that its possible underdetermination does not undermine.  Imagine 
listening at  a  concert:   a  violin and viola  are  playing on stage,  and 
someone asks you to point out the violin player.  You might be unable to 
do so, maybe because the two musicians are very close to each other – even if 
you know perfectly well what a viola and a violin respectively sound like. 
This does not prove that the differential principle is epistemically pointless 
and useless.  Recognizing that there is a difference between, respectively, 
the sound of a violin and the sound of a viola is a sufficient condition for 
the general judgment:  “There are two different sources of sound here”, 
but not necessarily a sufficient condition for the judgment that a certain 
object is the source of a certain sound.
Up to this point, we have discussed the matter of the object as being the 
content of sound information, but this content presents other aspects.  In a 
more complex, but often very clear fashion, we learn through hearing, that 
certain objects are hollow, or that they are composed of several assembled parts - 
that these parts are connected to each other like the gears of a clock, or that they 
have a greater freedom of movement, like marbles in a cardboard box. This kind 
of information is still related to the material, but also to other features of the object 
– i.e. its shape or the relational properties between its components, or even to the 
presence of relatively independent parts. We  can  use  a  general  concept 
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including all these determinations, and refer to the internal structure of 
the object.  Thus sounds are  sources of information concerning the 
internal structure of the object.  By contrast, colors most often inform us as 
to objects’ surface structure, and odors most often as to the basic material they 
are made of.
At this point, we can briefly discuss the distinction between musical sounds 
and noise (a distinction that doesn’t play any fundamental role in our arguments 
about the nature of sounds, because musical sounds and noise are not sharply 
distinguished from each other on the basis of their relationship to space or to 
their nature as events).   The distinction concerns, roughly, the difference 
between the effect produced by our hitting a table, and that which occurs 
when we hit a piano key, thus playing a note. The latter is what we call a 
musical sound; the first one is a non-musical sound or a noise.  Some authors 
(Piana,  1988:  222-223)  have  tried  to  introduce  a  phenomenological 
distinction between sounds and noises, on the basis of the fact that noises 
are  still  related to the object,  they are  permeated  by the material  that 
constitutes the object; while sounds, in the musical sense have the privilege 
of a certain independence (even if it is only relative) from the object, and 
become sound-objects, autonomous entities.   We do not by any means 
believe in this distinction.  The way the distinction is formulated (noises being 
fixed in matter, while musical sounds flutter in the wind, free from matter), that 
is to say, that musical sounds do not bear the mark of the instruments they are 
produced by, is not really plausible.   On the contrary, it is clear that the 
differential principle that we have mentioned above applies perfectly to 
musical sounds, and enables us to classify musical instruments according 
to  their  timber.   The only aspect of the phenomenological observation 
concerning the distinction between musical sounds and noises that we can 
make use of is that the purity of the first bears witness to the  purity of the  
structure of the objects which produce them.
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In the present chapter we have suggested that the essential criterion for 
distinguishing between perceptual modalities is constituted by the association 
of the sensory organ, on the one hand, and a specific class of beliefs on the 
other; we have also shown in what sense beliefs can be purely auditory, by 
distinguishing them in terms of the justification of their spatial and qualitative 
content.
